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I. INTRODUCTION     
All nations face increasing tension between exploiting Computer Network 
Operations (CNO) in the military sphere and protecting the global information grid.  The 
tension between these competing needs – one defensive and the other offensive – is the 
focal issue of this thesis.  Led by the United States (US), North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) nations are moving apace to develop doctrines and capabilities that 
will allow them to exploit cyberspace for military advantage.  Within the broad rubric of 
Information Operations (IO), there is increasing effort devoted to integrating CNO into 
routine military planning.  At the same time, these nations are becoming increasingly 
concerned at the dependency of their militaries, governments, economies and societies on 
the networked information systems that are emerging as the central nervous systems of 
post-industrial society.  They are taking a range of actions, both unilaterally and 
multilaterally, to mitigate the resultant risks1.  That the armed forces desire to exploit and 
use CNO to their advantage is the central argument for this developed concept. 
 
Wars are fought on various fronts.  The United States and her allies must use all 
resources at their disposal, including but not limited to:  political, economic, military, and 
information operations.  According to the National Security Strategy (NSS), our priority 
will be first to disrupt and destroy (adversarial) organizations of global reach, and to 
attack their leadership: command, control, and communications; material support; and 
finances.  This will have a disabling effect upon the (adversaries’) ability to plan and 
operate2.  
 
The National Military Strategy (NMS) is derived from the National Security 
Strategy, and is the role that the Department of Defense (DoD) will play in support of the 
NSS.  It is crucial that DoD identify a methodology for classifying the components of 
                                                 
1 Rathmell, Andrew Dr., Strategic and Organizational and Implications for Euro-Atlantic Security of 
Information Operations. [http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/rathmell.pdf]  December 2003. 
2 Bush, George, National Security Strategy, September 17, 2002, p. 5, 
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html] September 2003. 
1 
CNOs and how they can be used as weapons.  Such methodologies provide methods 
available to attack, exploit and defend cyber infrastructure.  President Bush has signed a 
secret directive3 ordering the government to develop, for the first time, national-level 
guidance for determining when and how the United States would launch cyber-attacks 
against enemy computer networks4.  This new offensive and defensive weapons platform, 
or CNO, can be clearly identified so that the leaders will have an understanding of terms, 
limitations and capabilities of cyber operations.  Thus, targets can be identified and 
universal terms established before commencement of operations.  A methodology 
incorporating doctrine can be created to identify the Rules of Engagement (ROE) as well 
as the CNO components.  The CNO area of operations and area of interest reach far 
beyond the typical battle space.  The battle space has evolved and has penetrated every 
element of military operations that utilize computers and networks.  When the cyber 
threats or objectives are identified, the target lists and components in CNO can be 
compiled.  This type of standing list of cyber targets and their components will allow the 
decision makers to act promptly and effectively.  Identifying causes and effects of a cyber 
attack will assist leaders to decide when and how to launch a cyber attack.  This paper 
proposes a methodology that provides a decision support system utilizing CNO as part of 
conventional operations. 
                                                 
3 Bradley Graham, ”Bush Orders Guidelines for Cyber-Warfare,” Washington Post, 7 February 2003:  




The DoD is grappling with decisions concerning the effective employment of 
Computer Network Operations (CNO).  Such decisions demand a good understanding of 
this new strategy. 
 
CNO has many definitions.  It is used as a synonym for information warfare (IW), 
computer network attack (CNA), and/or a component of information operations (IO).  
These operations, offensive and defensive in nature, imply both exploiting the 
adversaries’ systems and protecting one’s own.  CNO will be used to define military 
operations using computer technology and systems to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy 
resident information in computers and computer networks, or the computer networks 
themselves5 in either peace or wartime environments.  Interconnected computer systems 
are commonly referred to as a network, which is usually part of an infrastructure.  These 
operations, offensive and defensive in nature, imply both exploiting the adversaries’ 
systems and protecting one’s own.  The present state of CNO may be compared to that of 
the longbow prior to the battle of Crécy in 1346.  The longbow, a hand-drawn wooden 
bow held vertically and used by medieval English archers6, had already been invented 
and utilized in battle.  It was the employment of the two centuries old weapon by the 
English, led by Edward the III, which proved decisive against the larger French forces7.  
It was the utilization of an existing weapon in a manner that made use of its 
overwhelming capabilities.  Computer technology has evolved to the point that its 
utilization as a weapon is emerging. 
 
                                                 
5 Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Joint Publication 3-13, 9 October 1998, p. I-9, 
[http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf] January 2004. 
6 Longbow, [http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=longbow&x=21&y=19] 
December 2003. 
7 Sullivan, Gordon R. and Harper, Michael V.  Hope Is Not A Metod (New York, Broadway Books, 
1996), p. 10. 
3 
The need adapt and develop a methodology for CNO has been thrust on DoD.  
The technology exists; anyone with a computer and knowledge of its capabilities can 
exploit this technology.  The tasks at hand are how to use the new weapon to gain an 
advantage over our adversaries and simultaneously to create a defense in depth.  Gen 
Gordon R. Sullivan and Michael V. Harper in “Hope is Not a Method,” describe the 
Army’s catalyst for change during the 1980’s and 1990’s.  The end of the Cold War8 
forced the armed forces to adapt to a new environment.  The Army was not prepared, it 
failed to predict, anticipate or plan for this change.  At the time, the fall of the Berlin 
Wall was incomprehensible, coupled with the Panama invasion and Desert Shield/Storm, 
the Army was ill prepared to manage the monumental change.  The Army had to change 
given the external factors, the collapse of the “Evil Empire”.  Today the DoD must also 
change, given the advent of CNO.  Failing to act would allow adversaries to use the 
technology against our infrastructures and to overcome our superior weapons, similar to 
the English use of the longbow against the French. 
 
The DoD is at the dawn of CNO, a new dimension of warfare.  Private industry is 
now the leader in computer technological applications and systems.  The applications are 
imperfect.  These imperfections lead to vulnerabilities.  These vulnerabilities are a design 
flaw, implementation error: omissions left in place unintentionally, programming errors 
that have remained undetected prior to distribution.  Vulnerabilities may be malicious and 
non-malicious.  These vulnerabilities can be exploited to gain advantage against an 
adversary.  These systems are intertwined and connected to infrastructures that span far 
beyond the castle walls and create a new battle space. 
 
                                                 
8 Ibid., p. 3-6. 
4 
III. THE BATTLE SPACE FOR CNO 
Cyberspace is the new military operations frontier.  To “deny enemy leaders the 
means of conducting military operations and controlling their nations (or organizations)”9 
should be a national objective for the war in cyberspace.  Computer Network Operations 
(CNO) are information operations that aim to destroy, disrupt, deny and degrade enemy 
operations.  There are two components and a third ancillary role to CNO.  Computer 
Network Attack (CNA) and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) are its main 
components.  The necessary supporting role is Computer Network Defense (CND).  
Understanding and practicing CND sheds light on the capabilities of CNA and CNE. 
 
The focus of CND is the defense of critical information and the systems that make 
up the information infrastructure commonly referred to as cyberspace.  Computer 
network defense is the act of: “deterring, preventing, protecting, detecting, recovering, 
restoring, and responding.”10  What is the military defending?  Is the military defending 
nuclear weapons or the commissary?  A security breach of one can end the world, another 
will merely sound like the end of the world11.  For the purpose of this paper, the United 
States is defending both and neither.  On one hand, the United States is defending the 
information infrastructure that permits all military operations to function effectively and 
efficiently.  The amount of resources dedicated to the information infrastructure is 
determined by security needs commensurate with the level of risk12.  This paper will 
focus on the offensive aspects of CNO.  The defense of friendly computer networks is 
important because of US dependence on information.  Although the components of the 
defense of one’s information infrastructure are the similar in CNO, the significant task of 
how to defend against an attack will not be addressed in this paper. 
                                                 
9 Rand, The Joint Mission Framework Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield: An Overview, p. 61, 
[www.rand.org/publications/mr/mr1287/mr1287.ch2.pdf] September 2003. 
10 Denning, Dorothy Lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, September 2003. 
11 Wadlow, T. A. (2000).  The Process of Network Security. Addison Wesley: Reading, 
Massachusetts, p. 1.  
12 Government Information Security Reform, p. 2, [http://csrc.nist.gov/policies/Subtitle-G2.pdf], 
September 2003. 
5 
Computer Network Operations is a weapon that can either be classified as the 
main effort or a supporting role in a conventional military operation.  CNO must be 
employed methodically to ensure that decision makers receive accurate and timely 
information.  Given this accurate and timely information, the decision maker can 
determine the best course of action and can then mitigate the risk.  This thesis addresses 
the role of CNO and how it could be methodically employed as part of a holistic 
approach to military operations.  CNA and CNE are independent and conflicting 
operations when they share the same time and space continuum.  The goal of CNA is to 
deny, degrade, destroy or disrupt a machine’s ability to function as an information 
conduit.  The goal of CNE is to gather, manipulate or interject information being passed 
by the machines.  CNA is inconsistent with CNE.  Controls must be established to ensure 
target de-confliction.  Once an objective is identified, the decision-maker must decide 
whether CNO is part of the operation, or “is” the operation.     
 
Existing methodologies for target analysis and hacking, combined, can be used to 
inform decision makers.  The CARVER and Schmitt analysis are methodologies which, 
when used together, can provide the decision maker the information necessary to make an 
informed decision of Attack, Exploit or bypass a target.  The CARVER system is used 
for target analysis and vulnerability assessment.  The proposed methodology is a 
systematic approach that identifies the gathering of information for exploiting and/or 
attacking a cyber target. 
 
It is important to follow a methodology because it is possible to miss key pieces 
of information related to a specific technology or organization.13  CARVER and Schmitt 
analysis are complementary.  CARVER identifies key, important elements that need to be 
addressed during an operation.  Schmitt analysis identifies accountability and timing  
                                                 
13 McClure, Stuart, Scambray, Joel and Kurtz, George, Hacking Exposed, Network Security Secrets & 
Solutions, Third Edition, Osborne/McGraw-Hill, 2001, p. 4. 
6 
issues that feed information into a methodology.  A methodology feeds information to the 
decision maker and “must be horizontally integrated across strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels”14.  
  
Controlling the environment in which the enemy operates through CNO is a main 
cyberspace strategy goal.  CND will be a major area for the US strategy.  While the 
United States puts its effort into offensive CNO, CNA and CNE, the United States must 
also protect itself from attack.  As US strategy is implemented, tactics and procedures for 
CNO are monitored by adversaries who can use these activities against the United States 
and its interests.  CND is the active defense of information systems and extends beyond 
Operational Security (OPSEC) concerns.  
 
The commander’s strategy for military operations should use all available 
resources to limit an adversaries’ freedom of operation.  The commander needs to 
coordinate CNO with conventional strategy for in the conduct of military operations.  The 
main effort of the US cyber strategy will be to use CARVER and Schmitt to identify the 
targets and their vulnerabilities for CNE and CNA.  While conducting CNO, it should 
always be one step ahead with CND.  CNO operates in cyberspace and targets the 
information that flows through the network.  Cyberspace is used to transmit and receive 
information.   
Information is the soul of morale in combat and the balancing force in 
successful tactics.  Yet in an era of warfare which is on the whole 
extremely enlightened, when we are so concerned for the welfare of troops 
that we strain our supply so that fresh eggs and oranges may be served in 
the front line during the course of the most rapid advance by field armies 
in history (Germany, April-May, 1945), we have not found the means to 
assure an abundant flow of that most vital of all combat commodities - 
information15. 
 
                                                 
14 National Defense University (NDU), Information Operations, the Hard Reality of Soft Power, p. 39, 
[http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/jciws/iw/io_textbook.pdf] September 2003. 
15 Marshall, S. L. A. (1978). Men Against Fire:  The Problem of Battle Command in Future War, p. 
92, Gloucester, Massachusetts:  Peter Smith. 
7 
Today, unlike the Second World War (WWII), the United States has ready access 
to information, and time expected for message delivery is measured in milliseconds.  
With computers and computer systems, information can be relayed along the chain of 
command in the blink of an eye.   
8 
IV. PROJECT BASELINE – DEFINED 
It is important to understand the technology.  There is a potential disconnect in the 
terminology between cyber operations and conventional operations.  Current 
conventional operational terms can be used to define cyber warfare and can increase the 
understanding of the complexity of this new multifaceted means of war.  We need an 
easily understood, standard terminology that is incorporated into joint doctrine.  All 
agencies must have a common dictionary of terms regarding the breadth of information 
operations.  This mutual understanding of concepts and terms applied to cyber operations 
will permit battlefield commanders to employ cyber warfare effectively across the 
expansiveness of the battlefield.  This same understanding of cyber operations can be 
utilized in a deliberate defense against an attack on friendly assets.  
 
The weapons of cyberspace are 1’s and 0’s, used to disrupt and cause a system to 
do destructive operations on behalf of an attacker.  The attacker uses this tool to gain 
advantage over the adversary.  Attacks can be classified as covert or overt.  Most attacks 
can be conducted in a manner that either discloses to the victim that he is under attack or 
cloak the attack as a non-malicious problem.  A disruption to the operations of a 
computer network will highlight this point.  The cause of the computer network 
disruption can either be a missile strike (overt) or corruption of the address resolution 
protocol in a router (covert if done properly).  Both can cause the desired effect, 
disruption in service.  One is obvious while the other, not as clear, may be dealt with as a 
simple computer glitch.  The ultimate goal of any attack is to force the adversary to act or 
react in manner that serves the attacker’s objectives.  The attacker is trying to get a 
desired action from the adversary.  Selecting the target(s) that will best achieve the 
desired reaction is essential to the mission’s success.  It is necessary to understand the 





A. DESCRIPTION OF COMPUTER NETWORK OPERATIONS (CNO)  
 
Computer network operations are part of information operations (IO) and 
information warfare (IW).  IO is similar to IW operations conducted during non-wartime 
situations.  
Information warfare is the action taken to achieve information superiority 
by affecting an adversary’s information, information-based processes, 
information systems, and computer-based networks while defending one’s 
own information, information-based processes, information systems and 
computer-based networks.16  
Computer Network Operations are maturing to become one of the core 
competencies of IO/IW.  CNO is the use of computer information systems to attack and 
exploit adversary information, information-based processes, information systems, and 
computer-based networks.  The means of the operation is what distinguishes CNO from 
other operations.  A computer network can be destroyed by means of kinetic energy or 
electro-magnetic pulse; a CNO utilizes hardware and software programs to achieve its 
desired effects.  CNOs can also be used to defend one’s own information, information-
based processes, information systems and computer-based networks.  This constitutes a 
computer network defense.  In short, CNOs is defined as the use of computer systems to 
conduct military operations on the battlefield. 
 
Successful CNO deployments depend on intelligence and preparation tailored to 
the situation at hand.  Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is a method of 
collecting, organizing, and processing intelligence.17  In order to ensure effective CNO, 




                                                 
16 DOD Information Operations Roadmap, 30 October 2003, [http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/] 
November 2003. 
17 Rand, The Joint Mission Framework Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield: An Overview, p. 7, 
[http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1287/MR1287.ch1.pdf] September 2003. 
10 
• Perform network reconnaissance against the target system. 
• Map attributes such as operating system, architecture, and specific 
versions of listening services to known vulnerabilities and exploits. 
• Perform target acquisition by identifying and selecting key systems. 
• Enumerate and prioritize potential points of entry. 
 
B. EXPLANATION OF TYPES OF ATTACKS 
Computer Network Attacks (CNA's) are designed to deny, disrupt, degrade, or 
destroy either the information in computer and computer networks, or the computers and 
networks themselves18.  CNA's are usually focused on attacking the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of information.  CNA's are identified by their intentions within 
the mission.  The following sections describe the four main types of CNA attack.   
 
Deny - The purpose of this attack is to deny access to information.  CNA’s that 
deny access to information come in various forms.  One of the most common of these is a 
Denial of Service (DOS) attack, which focuses on denying availability of information to 
authorized users for a specific time.  A denial attack has the desired effect of preventing 
authorized users from accessing information by means of their computer information 
systems. 
 
Disrupt - This type of attack focuses on disrupting as “attackers might 
surreptitiously reprogram enemy computers to disrupt the processes they control”19.  The 
following elaborates on the purpose of a disruption attack.  Denying electricity to an area 
by reprogramming the computers that control distribution within the power grid.  A 
disruption attack introduces disorder and inhibits the effective utilization of information 
on the computer information systems. 
 
                                                 
18 Bayles, William J. , The Ethics of Computer Network Attack, 
[http://www.totse.com/en/hack/legalities_of_hacking/excerpt4.html] September 2003 
19 Ibid. 
11 
Degrade - The purpose of this type of attack is to reduce the throughput of 
information, in an effort that “forces the enemy to use less efficient communications and 
processing means, slowing his logistics and decision cycles”20 similar to use of 
conventional obstacles on a battlefield.  A degradation attack creates latency in a system 
and can be used to channel information through more vulnerable systems.  The attacker 
can take advantage of channalizations by directing or leading the adversary into the 
desired battle space.  The desired battle space can be the use of a more vulnerable 
medium.  It does not have to be network-related (e.g., unsecured telephone or radio 
transmission).  This attack can support the exploitation of a computer system.   
 
Destroy - As the name implies, this attack is the most forceful.  Kinetic munitions 
could be used to accomplish this, but kinetic munitions are conventional means of 
engaging targets and not CNA.  Instead, a CNA destruction attack involves viruses and/or 
other malicious programs to destroy computer networks and associated software and 
hardware components.   
 
C. COMPUTER NETWORK EXPLOITATION 
Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) is the collection of intelligence and 
enabling operations in order to gather data from target adversary automated information 
systems (AIS) or networks21.  CNE, the 2nd pillar of CNO, is the gathering and 
manipulation of information.  This information is used to enhance the friendly elements 
observation of the battlefield while obscuring that of the target.  John Boyd’s [United 
States Air Force (Retired)] decision cycle model reflects the importance of information in 
the decision making capabilities of allies and adversaries.  Command, control, 
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) are 
the targets of CNE.  Information is the goal; taking advantage of the media is the means.  
 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 United States Joint Forces Command, [http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm] September 2003. 
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CNE is the deliberate act of infiltrating an adversary’s information systems to 
affect the decision-making capabilities of the target adversely and enhancing intelligence 
of friendly elements.  COL(R) Boyd’s Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action 
cycle (OODA Loop) focuses on affecting the decision maker’s ability to act decisively in 
the right time and space.  By having control of the adversary’s OODA loop, the friendly 
elements can gain decision superiority.  Decision superiority is the ability of the allied 
commander - based upon information superiority and situational understanding - to make 
effective decisions more rapidly than the adversary, thereby allowing one to dramatically 
increase the pace, coherence, and effectiveness of operations22.  CNE allows the allied 
commander to extract intelligence information from the target system’s network that can 
enhance the capabilities of current and future operations.  CNE also allows the allied 
commander to inject information that degrades the adversary’s abilities to observe the 
battle space properly.  Extraction and injection are defined as follows: 
• Extraction - Extracting information is the act of capturing data streams 
transiting a network or gaining access to target-resident files.  Access to 
the links and nodes of the network topology is necessary to gain the 
information.  The assets gathered from the exploitation are processed, 
analyzed, integrated and interpreted to determine the state of the 
adversary’s orientation.  Information and knowledge about an adversary, 
obtained through the observation of the information stored on the 
adversary’s computers, can be used to the advantage of the allied 
commanders.  The intelligence gathered from this extraction of data can 
then be utilized to return to a target and inject information.  This is a 
passive (listening) technique. 
• Injection - This involves injecting data streams or files in manipulation of 
the adversary’s information.  This injection gives the friendly commander 
the ability to manipulate the information, thus distorting an adversary’s 
perception or observation of the battle space, to the advantage of the allied 
commander.  This is an active (modifying) technique. 
Attaching to a network can be accomplished physically or through cyberspace.  
The links and nodes to be targeted must be within an adversary’s trusted network.  The 
trusted network is assumed to contain valid and credible information by the adversary.  
Attaching to a network using physical means is done by introducing hardware and/or  
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
13 
software that has the capability of gathering and storing data for use by the allied 
commander.  Attaching to a network through cyberspace is gaining unauthorized access 
to the network external to the trusted infrastructure.  
 
Control the information, then you control the battle space.  By attacking and/or 
exploiting the information on an adversary’s computer network, the commander can then 
control the enemy’s OODA loop and can thus influence the success of allied operations.  
Attacks and exploits are the “what” in the phrase “Who, what, where, when and why?”  
The “why” is to gain decision superiority.  “What” are you going to attack and exploit?  
“What” are you going to target? 
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V. THE TARGETS 
A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF CNO TARGETS  
The targets of CNO are the pertinent information systems that the adversary 
utilizes to assist in making decisions.  These systems are networks comprised of hardware 
and software.  “Cyberspace is the information space consisting of the sum total of all 
computer networks”23.  In order to prepare for an attack and to engage the target 
effectively, a description of the hardware and software must be acquired.  The following 
section describes hardware, software and configurations that can be targeted.  
 
1. Hardware 
Computer network hardware is essentially any physical component that has 
connectivity to a network and processes or passes information to another component or to 
the end user.  The hardware can be a computer, but it is not limited to that (Figure 1).  
Hardware is typically a nodal point of a network topology.  Examples of nodal platforms 
that can be targeted are computers, peripheral devices, networking devices, and servers. 
• Computer – A computer is a programmable machine that can respond to 
specific set of instructions and can execute programs24.  A computer 
consists of memory, central processing unit, mass storage device and 
peripheral devices.  A computer is hardware that can be setup in a myriad 
of configurations.  Performance and mobility are influenced by size, 
design, and processing power.  The general choice of the platform is a 
question of functionality and the purpose to be achieved.  Computers, like 
most hardware devices, have configurable software that runs the system. 
• Peripheral devices – A peripheral device is not part of the essential 
computer.  These components are both internal and external devices, and 
include printers, monitors, disk drives, scanners and other input/output 
devices.  The software that controls peripheral devices is called a driver. 
• Network Device – A network device is a machine that passes information 
between computers.  Common network devices are routers, switches, and 
hubs.  A network device forwards data along the network.  The network 
device has a series of rules or communication protocols that specify how 
packet headers are formed and how packets are processed.  The set of 
                                                 
23 Denning, D. E.  (1999).  Information Warfare and Security.  Georgetown University:  Addison-
Wesley, Boston, p. 22. 
24 [Webopedia.com] February 2003. 
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protocols used for the Internet are named TCP/IP after the two most 
important protocols in the set: the Transmission Control Protocol and the 
Internet Protocol.  Hardware devices that connect networks in the Internet 
are called IP routers because they follow the IP protocol when forwarding 
packets.  A router examines the header in each packet that arrives to 
determine the packet’s destination.  The router either delivers the packet to 
the destination computer across a local network or forwards the packet to 
another router closer to the final destination.  Thus, a packet travels from 
router to router as it passes through the Internet.  Similar devices to routers 
are switches, hubs and devices that, when configured, can behave like a 
device with lower capabilities.  
• Servers – A server is a computer that allocates resources on a network.  A 
server can manage resources for other computers.  The physical 
characteristics of a server are similar to those of a computer but differ in 
function25.  A Server is a computer running administrative software that 
controls access to all or part of the network and its resources.  A computer 
acting as a server makes resources available to computers acting as clients 
on the network.  There is no specific way to penetrate a server since there 
are uncounted possibilities 
 
 
Figure 1.   Computer Hardware Examples 
 
The second set of components in a computer network are the links.  The links are 
hardware or means by which data is passed from one nodal device to another.  A link 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
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connects nodes (Figure 2).  The actual connections to the hardware are one of many 
peripheral devices designed to accommodate the specific type of means used by the link.  
The link is characterized by medium, protocol, throughput and maximum distance 
between two nodes.  The media can be a wires, radio waves, or optical connections.  
Common media include fiber optics, coax copper wire and radio frequencies (RF).  A 
protocol, such as Ethernet, is an agreed-upon format for transmitting data between two 
devices26.  Protocols can be, but are not always, media-specific, e.g., RF Wireless 
protocols (Table 1), yet share some commonality. 
 
Network link and Nodal Topology 
 
 










                                                 
26 Ibid. 
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Table 1. Wireless Designations27 
 
Standard Data Rate Modulation Scheme Security Pros/Cons 













OFDM  WEP & WPA  
Products that adhere to this standard are considered 
"Wi-Fi Certified." Eight available channels. Less 
potential for RF interference than 802.11b and 
802.11g. Better than 802.11b at supporting multimedia 
voice, video and large-image applications in densely 
populated user environments. Relatively shorter range 








DSSS with CCK  WEP & WPA  
Products that adhere to this standard are considered 
"Wi-Fi Certified." Not interoperable with 802.11a. 
Requires fewer access points than 802.11a for coverage 
of large areas. Offers high-speed access to data at up to 
300 feet from base station. 14 channels available in the 
2.4GHz band (only 11 of which can be used in the U.S. 
due to FCC regulations) with only three non-










with CCK below 
20Mbps  
WEP & WPA  
Products that adhere to this standard are considered 
“Wi-Fi Certified.” May replace 802.11b. Improved 
security enhancements over 802.11. Compatible with 
802.11b. 14 channels available in the 2.4GHz band 
(only 11 of which can be used in the U.S. due to FCC 







FHSS  PPTP, SSL or VPN  
No native support for IP, so it does not support TCP/IP 
and wireless LAN applications well. Not originally 
created to support wireless LANs. Best suited for 








Independent network IP 
addresses for each 
network. Data is sent 
with a 56-bit encryption 
algorithm.  
Note: HomeRF is no longer being supported by any 
vendors or working groups. Intended for use in homes, 
not enterprises. Range is only 150 feet from base 
station. Relatively inexpensive to set up and maintain. 
Voice quality is always good because it continuously 
reserves a chunk of bandwidth for voice services. 
Responds well to interference because of frequency-











Only in Europe. HiperLAN is totally ad-hoc, requiring 
no configuration and no central controller. Doesn't 
provide real isochronous services. Relatively expensive 








Strong security features 





Only in Europe. Designed to carry ATM cells, IP 
packets, Firewire packets (IEEE 1394) and digital 
voice (from cellular phones). Better quality of service 
than HiperLAN/1 and guarantees bandwidth.  
 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
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Within theses standards, there exist several sub-designations, such as wireless, 
Simple Network Management (SNMP), Internet (IP) and its subsets Internet Control 
Message Protocol (ICMP), Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), User Datagram 
Protocol (UDP), File Transfer (FTP), Hyper Text Transfer (HTTP), HTTP Secure 
(HTTPS), and Dynamic Host Control (DHCP) protocols.  Vulnerabilities can be 
exploited at every level of the Open Source Interconnect model depending on the 
protocol that is being used. 
The Open System Interconnection (OSI) model defines a networking 
framework for implementing protocols in seven layers. Control is passed 
from one layer to the next, starting at the application layer in one station, 
proceeding to the bottom layer, over the channel to the next station and 
back up the hierarchy.28 
By understanding the software application the attacker can isolate the 
vulnerabilities that lead to a successful attack.  Information is passed through the OSI 
stack from one device to another with a link that connects at the physical layers, Figure 3.  
Each of the seven layers has a specific function and utilizes specific programs or software 
and different protocols, Table 2.  







Figure 3.   Layers of OSI 
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Table 2. OSI Model29 
 
ISO-OSI Model  
Layer  Function  Protocol  
Application 
(Layer 7) 
This layer supports application and end-user processes.  
Communication partners are identified, quality of service is identified, 
user authentication and privacy are considered, and any constraints on 
data syntax are identified.  Everything at this layer is application-
specific.  This layer provides application services for file transfers, e-
mail, and other network software services.  Telnet and FTP are 
applications that exist entirely in the application level.  Tiered 





NFS, FINGER  
Presentation 
(Layer 6) 
This layer provides independence from differences in data 
representation (e.g., encryption) by translating from application to 
network format, and vice versa.  The presentation layer works to 
transform data into the form that the application layer can accept.  This 
layer formats and encrypts data to be sent across a network, providing 





This layer establishes, manages and terminates connections between 
applications.  The session layer sets up, coordinates, and terminates 
conversations, exchanges, and dialogues between the applications at 




This layer provides transparent transfer of data between end systems, or 
hosts, and is responsible for end-to-end error recovery and flow control.  
It ensures complete data transfer. 
TCP, UDP  
Network 
(Layer 3) 
This layer provides switching and routing technologies, creating logical 
paths, known as virtual circuits, for transmitting data from node to 
node.  Routing and forwarding are functions of this layer, as well as 
addressing, internetworking, error handling, congestion control and 
packet sequencing. 
IP, ARP, RARP, 
ICMP, RIP, OSPF, 
BGP, IGMP  
Data Link 
(Layer 2) 
At this layer, data packets are encoded and decoded into bits.  It 
furnishes transmission protocol knowledge and management and 
handles errors in the physical layer, flow control and frame 
synchronization.  The data link layer is divided into two sublayers: The 
Media Access Control (MAC) layer and the Logical Link Control 
(LLC) layer.  The MAC sublayer controls how a computer on the 
network gains access to the data and permission to transmit it. The LLC 
layer controls frame synchronization, flow control and error checking. 




This layer conveys the bit stream - electrical impulse, light or radio 
signal -- through the network at the electrical and mechanical level.  It 
provides the hardware means of sending and receiving data on a carrier, 
including defining cables, cards and physical aspects.  Fast Ethernet, 
RS232, and ATM are protocols with physical layer components. 
ISO 2110, IEEE 
802, IEEE 802.2  
 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
21 
Some protocols are layered when more than one protocol is in use.  Layered 
protocol implies that during a transmission of information, more than one protocol may 
be used.  Each designation may have its own type of peripheral device to connect the 
hardware.  Other common standards are Infrared Data Association (IrDA), a group of 
device manufacturers that developed a standard for transmitting data via infrared light 
waves and fiber optic, a technology that uses glass (or plastic) threads (fibers) to transmit 
data30. 
 
One must also consider the possibility that some attacker might be successful in 
having the adversary execute the malicious code or attack for him.  This is done by 
utilizing a Trojan Horse.  A Trojan horse is “a program that purports to be a useful tool 
but actually installs malicious or damaging software behind the scenes”31.  On execution, 
this software will open a back door for the attacker, allowing him to control the machine.  




Software is the program that controls the hardware.  All hardware has software 
associated with its operation.  There are generally two types of software, system and 
application software. 
1. System software refers to the operating system and all utility 
programs that manage computer resources at a low level.  Non-O/S 
systems software includes compilers, loaders, linkers, and 
debuggers.32  
2. Applications software comprises programs designed for the end 
user, and includes word processors, database systems, and 
spreadsheet programs.  
 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 McClure, Stuart, Scambray, Joel, Kurtz, George, Hacking Exposed, Network Security Secrets & 
Solutions, Third Edition, Osborne/McGraw-Hill, 2001, p. 123. 
32 [Webopedia.com] February 2003. 
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Many computers also contain an operating system (OS) as we all know e.g. 
Windows, MAC OS, UNIX or Linux.  The operating systems are by far the most 
complex piece of software that run on a given system.  
Operating systems perform basic tasks, such as recognizing keyboard 
input, sending output to the display screen, keeping track of files and 
directories, and controlling peripheral devices such as disk drives and 
printers.  For large systems, the operating system has even greater 
responsibilities and powers.  Like a traffic cop, it makes sure that different 
programs and users running at the same time do not interfere with each 
other.  The operating system is also responsible for security, ensuring that 
unauthorized users do not access the system.33  
Due to the complexity of OS’s, numerous vulnerabilities exist.  The number of 
patches available for today’s OS is growing exponentially due to the vulnerabilities and 
security holes exploited by hackers.  A computer patch is temporary fix of an error or 
defect in software program. 
 
The importance in understanding hardware and software lies in their 
vulnerabilities.  Vulnerabilities exist in the software that runs on the computer networks.  
Computer networks are comprised of hardware and software.  It is said that the most 
secure computers are those that are turned off.  Computers that are part of a network are 
exposed to attack and exploitation if not configured properly and/or any one of the nodes 
and links is vulnerable.  Information systems can be hardened, yet vulnerabilities still 
exist, remaining to be discovered or exploited.  Hardware and software connects the 
internet, intranets, extranets, wide area networks, local area networks and therefore can 
be attacked.  As an attacker hops along the chain he or she can exploit the systems by 
using flaws and vulnerabilities residing in the firmware, operating system, or running 
applications 
  
Firmware is the most basic software that runs standalone systems like Switches or 
Wireless Access Points.  It is not designed to be easily changed, but can be configured by  
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
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a somewhat difficult process called flashing (the process of updating the firmware 
memory).  Firmware is also referred to as ROMs, PROMs and EPROMs (variations of 
Read Only Memory). 
 
A service is the interface that connects the data being transferred between 
computer transmissions.  There are two broad categories of services, connectionless and 
connection-oriented.  Connectionless services are analogous to a fire and forget (FF) 
missile system.  In a connectionless system, a message is sent to the destination and no 
further action is required by the sender.  The data being sent (the missile) must have 
coordinates of the destination and the message (the munitions).  If the FF missile control 
is being passed or handed off to an enroute navigation system, the coordinates must be in 
a predetermined and agreed upon protocol or format for the hand-off to occur.  The 
predetermined and agreed upon protocol or format is known as the addressing scheme.  
All the information is contained in the FF missile; there is no reach back for information 
to the launching platform.  In a connection-oriented scenario, a stream of information is 
passed between sender and receiver, such as a Tube Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire 
Guided (TOW) Missile.  With a TOW missile, bursts of data are sent between the missile 
and launcher.  The data steam must be continuous or the TOW missile may not hit the 
intended target.  When the connection is established, the passing of information is 
continuous until the transmission is terminated by either sender or receiver.  
Connectionless and connection-oriented are generic terms that incorporate many 
technologies and designs.  It is sufficient to understand what type of service is being 
targeted. 
 
As new operating systems are developed, the trend goes towards more security, 
but coding errors, incorrect functionality, poor design, and insecure default settings leave 
systems susceptible to new attack.  In addition to the generic OS, the inter-networking 
OS, abbreviated IOS is a special operating system that runs networking devices like 
routers.  Although the functionality is specifically tailored to the needs of the router and 
its remote control, it still can be either poorly configured or flawed.  Especially when a 
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router is overtaken by an attacker it is difficult to determine the damage and to re-
establish security.  The questions in case of attack are how long did the attacker own the 
device?  Did he reroute the traffic, filter the traffic or just enforce a denial of service?  
Further, there is the application itself that runs on the networked platform.  Very well 
known applications are the internet browser or the email program.  They might and do 
help an attacker to be successful by having flaws and security holes like OS’s. 
 
B. ATTACK VECTOR  
1. General Description of a Vector 
For every computer network operation there must be a vector to deliver the 
payload.  The vector is equivalent to avenue of approach for conventional operations.  A 
vector is the route of a CNO leading to its target or key position in relation to the targeted 
network.  Attack vectors require both physical and cyberspace access.  Access is virtually 
unlimited by location.  The start point of the attack can occur on the battlefield, from a 
neighboring country or the United States, or a deployable platform from the sea, land, air, 
or space.  The route of an attack is important for international implications and 
responsibilities. 
 
2. Vector Flight Path  
An attack vector is the route that successfully leads to the target.  Attack vectors 
are literally the keys that allow payloads to be executed on the target34.  The payload is 
the destructive program that will facilitate or execute an attack or exploitation.  A 
payload is designed for a specific target to accomplish a desired effect.  The vector used 
to deliver the payload is also specifically designed or utilized to support the desired 
effect.  Vectors have limited life span, and are vulnerable because they take advantage of 
security holes on target networks.  Security holes can be intentional and unintentional.  
Commanders use vectors to exploit security holes for unauthorized access to the target 
system.  Once the vector is utilized and discovered, it can be closed.  Many vectors are 
likely to be closed through normal system updates to operating systems, virus scans, 
firewall updates, intrusion detection systems, etc.  Another factor that limits the utility of 
                                                 
34 H. B. Gary, Phoenix Challenge Conference, July 2003, Gregg Hoglund, LLC. 
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a vector is when a rogue cracker exposes the vulnerability of a vector.  A cracker is an 
individual or group whose sole aim is to gain unauthorized access to a system or utility 
from a program. 
 
The start point of the vector can determine what type of vector is acceptable based 
on the rules of engagement.  CNO vectors, arguably, can be construed as being subject to 
laws, national and international, similar to aircraft.  A CNO vector is equivalent to an 
aircraft flight path.  Just as the bomb an aircraft carries is the payload that will inflict 
physical damage, a CNO payload is the software or data component that exploits a 
known computer system vulnerability.  The vectors must be directed to ensure 
compliance with existing laws or operational rules of engagement that are self imposed 
rules and guidelines which can be more restrictive than laws.  Vectors that begin on the 
battlefield may require physical access to target systems or ancillary systems that can 
have trusted access to the target system. 
 
Vectors have a limited utility.  Repeated exposure can limit their usability when 
the adversary is able to patch the security hole effectively.  Physical access is subject to 
similar time constraints if the vulnerability is discovered and secured.  The most valuable 
systems vulnerabilities are zero-day exploits.  A zero-day exploit is one that exists prior 
to the availability of any patches or mitigating techniques for the associated vulnerability.  
Any vulnerability, either poorly configured or unpatched system, is subject to 
exploitation - zero-day or otherwise - and must be closely managed to ensure the vector 
exists so that commanders can use it to accomplish its mission. 
 
C. TARGETING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE  
1. Type of Target 
The widespread usage of computers in the military and commercial sector has 
ensured technology dependency by both civilian and government entities.  Technology 
transcends all sectors of a nation, including business, finance, educational, or military 
institutions.  Such dependency has elevated technology to a strategic, operational and 
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tactical center of gravity.  CNA’s may be focused on either military or civilian targets, 
but in most cases will affect both.  CNA’s, like any other type of attack, may be used to 
influence politics or other types of events such as financial, social, or military35.  
 
2. Civilian Targets 
Civilian targets include any infrastructure that supports the civilian population 
either directly or indirectly.  Civilian infrastructure is owned by the public and private 
sector.  Civilian targets are the focus when attacks are designed to “disrupt electricity 
supplies and telephone service, interfere with air traffic control, cause leaks or explosions 
at chemical plants or refineries, and cause economic damage,” all in an effort to indirectly 
affect civilians36.   
 
The computer systems that operate civilian industrial infrastructure are known as 
SCADA systems.  SCADA systems, supervisory control and data acquisition, are 
vulnerable targets because they are unique systems, not scrutinized by thousand of users 
and agencies as is Microsoft Windows.  SCADA’s are not upgraded with the same 
frequency as more heavily used software, due to complexity and expense.  For instance, 
“The SCADA system used by the Manchester Power in New England was deployed in 
early 1970’s  and had not been substantially changed as of 1997”37.  Exploits and 
vulnerabilities may remain in zero-day-exploit state for many years and make SCADA’s 
opportunistic targets. 
 
3. Military Targets  
Military targets include infrastructure, software, hardware or data that influences 
Command and Control (C2), a part of Command and Control Warfare (C2W).  Attacking  
                                                 
35 Buettner, Raymond, Naval Postgraduate School, October 2002. 
36 Bayless, William J., The Ethics of Computer Network Attack, 
[http://www.totse.com/en/hack/legalities_of_hacking/excerpt4.html] September 2003. 
37 Rattray, Gregory J. Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace, The MIT Press, Massachusetts, 2001, p. 58. 
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and destroying such military targets results in degrading or destroying an adversary’s 
ability to command and control forces, thus increasing “uncertainty of war for the 
adversary and a slowing of his decision cycle.”38 
  
4. Critical Infrastructure Defined 
Those systems and assets essential to plan, mobilize, deploy, and sustain military 
operations and transition to post-conflict military operations, and whose loss or 
degradation jeopardize the ability of the Department of Defense to execute the National 
Military Strategy39 .   
 
It is the policy of the United States to protect against disruption of the 
operation of information systems for critical infrastructure and thereby 
help to protect the people, economy, essential human and government 
services, and national security of the United States, and to ensure that any 
disruptions that occur are infrequent, of minimal duration, and 
manageable, and cause the least damage possible.  President George W. 
Bush40 
 
DoD has an infrastructure that is interwoven with civilian infrastructure.  The 
United States government has identified nine sectors of critical infrastructure.  Military 
targets can be legitimate attack objectives as well as the civilian sector.  The United 
States government has paired the civilian infrastructure with the DoD equivalent sector.  
The logic behind this pairing is that the safeguards of one can used to protect the other.  
An inference can also be made that a weakness in one may also be found in the other.  
The nine sectors and the civilian and their military counterparts are depicted in Table 3. 
 
                                                 
38 Bayles, William J., The Ethics of Computer Network Attack, 
[http://www.totse.com/en/hack/legalities_of_hacking/excerpt4.html] September 2003. 
39 Joint Staff Definition used in coordinated response to Draft DoDD 8500.l, 
[http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/index.html] November 2003. 
40 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040121-6.html] January 2004. 
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Table 3. Nine Sectors and the Civilian and Their Military Counterparts 
 
The depiction may give the impression that they are separate entities.  In reality, 
Civilian and Military sectors share much of the same infrastructure.  This infrastructure is 
vulnerable to CNO.  The military infrastructure can be expected to maintain a high level 
of security and protection.  The same conclusion cannot be assumed for the civilian 
sector.  The focus of military organizations is to attack and defend.  This philosophy can 
be carried over to computer networks.  Although the actual implementation may vary by 
target, the concepts of attacking and defending information may not be new.  On the 
other hand, the civilian sector is not motivated by military conflict.  Here, motivations 
vary depending on the type of institution and its customer base.  Some civilian 
institutions provide a service of availability such as the transportation sector.  The pairing 
of the civilian and military sectors provides a military focus of security to the civilian 
sector, while providing the innovation and resources of the private sector to the military.  
In the transportation sector, for instance, guarding its automated rail and traffic systems is 
not its primary focus.  As the period following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 
demonstrated, the state of California could not protect its key infrastructure, major  
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bridges, causeways, and highways, without military assistance.  The lesson to be learned 
from this is that a method of targeting the military information systems may be via its 
civilian counter part. 
The military does not control its entire infrastructure.  DoD is dependant on the 
civilian infrastructure with few exceptions.  The functions that each of these sectors 
provide are categorized with the key responsibilities and missions that can be targeted.  
The military sectors are as follows: 
• Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) fulfills the important 
fiscal responsibilities for the DoD.41 
• US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) the single manager of the 
Defense Transportation System (DTS), comprised of American land, sea 
and air mobility assets.  Coordinate enroute support of troops and 
equipment.  USTRANSCOM moves troops and equipment through 
coordinated use of military and commercial transportation modes.42 
• US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) provides planning, designing, 
building and operating water resources and other civil works projects 
(Navigation, Flood Control, Environmental Protection, Disaster Response, 
etc.).  Designing and managing the construction of military facilities for 
the Army and Air Force. (Military Construction) Providing design and 
construction management support for other Defense and federal agencies. 
(Interagency and International Services).43  
• Defense Information System Agency (DISA) enables communications, 
joint command and control, defensive information operations, combat 
support computing, and joint interoperability support.44 
• Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) provides military intelligence to 
warfighters, defense policymakers and force planners, in the Department 
of Defense and the Intelligence Community, in support of U.S. military 
planning and operations and weapon systems acquisition.45  
• Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD), Health’s mission is to 
enhance DoD and our Nation’s security by providing health support for 
the full range of military operations and sustaining the health of all those 
entrusted to our care.46 
• Defense Human Resource Activity (DHRA) mission is to provide program 
support, information management, and administrative services to the DoD 
Components on human resource matters and to collect, archive and 
                                                 
41 [http://www.dfas.mil/] September 2003. 
42 [http://www.transcom.mil/] September 2003. 
43 [www.usace.army.mil/] September 2003. 
44 [www.disa.mil/] September 2003. 
45 [http://www.dia.mil/] September 2003. 
46 [www.ha.osd.mil] September 2003. 
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provide management information, research and analysis of human 
resources and other related functional area data bases for the DoD.47  
• US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) has the mission launching and 
operating satellites, supporting joint-service military forces worldwide 
with intelligence, communications, weather, navigation, and ballistic 
missile attack warning information, engaging adversaries from space and 
assuring U.S. access to, and operation in, space and denying enemies that 
same freedom.48 
• Defense Logistic Agency (DLA) provides worldwide logistics support for 
the missions of the Military Departments and the Unified Combatant 
Commands under conditions of peace and war.  It also provides logistics 
support to other DoD Components and certain Federal agencies, foreign 
governments, international organizations, and others as authorized.49 
The military sector may be the target, but the vector of attack may begin in the 
civilian infrastructure that is can be less hardened and guarded.  The bridge between the 
civilian and military infrastructure is likely found in the network.  The risk associated 
with the infrastructure can be measured.  By reverse engineering a risk model, the likely 
vector and payload can be determined. 
 
D. SIMPLE RISK MODEL  
Figure 4 depicts that criticality is determined according to the importance of 
contribution to the mission.  Threat and vulnerability do not determine criticality50.  
• Determine what is most important; identify the critical infrastructure 
assets.   
• Prioritize asset assessments based on the threat to critical assets, if specific 
threat information is available.   
• Pick from the critical assets priority list to establish the vulnerability 
assessment work program.   
• Evaluate risks from a mission perspective. 
 
 
                                                 
47 [www.dhra.osd.mil] September 2003. 
48 [www.stratcom.af.mil] September 2003. 
49 [www.dla.mil/] September 2003. 








CNO’s do not automatically discriminate between civilian or military 
infrastructure.  This further complicates policy and tactical employment.  Commanders 
need to control and limit collateral damage.  Target coordination is necessary to ensure 
that deconfliction occurs in the battle space between conventional forces, CNA, and CNE 
operators.  As the network-centric era of warfare progresses, it is incumbent upon 
military leaders to harness the energy of these weapons and use them to fight our nation’s 
battles in an effective, efficient, informed, ethical, and lawful manner.  It is incumbent on 
military planners to provide the systems to allow commanders to make the informed 
decisions. 
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An understanding of the complexity of networks and their function, commanders 
can recognize their vulnerabilities and exposure to threats.  The targets can be military, 
civilian or dual use infrastructure.  The vulnerabilities can be exploited to gain an 
advantage over an adversary.  With this knowledge, a methodology can be developed to 
assist the commander in decision making.  Controlling the information that the adversary 
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VI. THE METHODOLOGY 
A. WHAT IS A METHODOLOGY?  
A methodology attempts to provide a mechanism for evaluating data and injecting 
knowledge to reach a reasonable conclusion.  The way in which one discovers 
information; a methodology describes how something will be (or was) done.  The 
methodology includes the methods, procedures, and techniques used to collect and 
analyze information51.  A methodology is a systematic observation of events that 
provides commanders the understanding to make decisions and to act appropriately for 
the given situation or environment.  The orientation and understanding of computer 
network operations varies between commanders.   
 
The use of methodologies is widespread and done subconsciously to assist 
individuals in decision making.  The processes that one utilizes to make everyday 
decisions are complex.  Everyday decisions have many variables that are quickly sorted, 
ordered, valued or weighed and compared to arrive at something as simple as how to 
begin the day.  That information is processed based on one’s knowledge and experience.  
Where to eat breakfast is one example.  The possibilities are numerous, and include 
preparing a hot meal vs. a cold meal in the home or eating at a restaurant: fast-food vs. 
dining in.  Within these categories there are subcategories: the type of food available, 
time available for preparation and consumption and other even more subjective reasons, 
such as diet, likes or dislikes, how the food will interact with the afternoon or evening 
meals.  Decisions like those described are made in seconds by individuals and the best 
outcome depends on the value placed on each aspect of the decision.  The outcome will 
vary for most people based on their own experience, expectations and desires.  The same 
question presented to a group is unlikely to be decided as efficiently as meeting the needs 
and desires of one individual.  Couple the question with an unfamiliar or dynamic subject 
and the outcome is less clear then a familiar subject area.  A methodology can improve  
                                                 
51 JP 3-05.5 Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures, 
[www.synergyaids.com/lacriaids/glossary.asp] August 1993. 
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the effectiveness and efficiency of the decision making process.  By using an appropriate 
methodology, something as simple as “what is for breakfast?” can be used for problems 
more complex problems like “how to engage a hostile enemy force?” 
 
The United States military uses methodologies to plan warfare.  It uses 
methodologies to enable the comparison and categorization of different plans, capabilities 
and desired results.  Two widespread methodologies include CARVER and the Military 
Decision Making Process (MDMP).  A third methodology is the Schmitt Analysis that 
examines a measured response to Computer Network Operations (CNO) and the 
geopolitical and military ramifications.  The objective is to combine these three different 
methodologies into one that can then be applied to a military decision support system.  
 
B. CURRENT METHODOLOGIES 
1. Military Decision Making Process 
The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is used throughout the US Army 
to evaluate and compare courses of action (COA) that have a common goal and desired 
result.  MDMP is an analytical technique that helps commanders and their staffs reach 
logical decisions in the employment of force.  The military decision making process is 
fed information and products by several subsystems.  Each subsystem is made up of staff 
estimates of the capabilities of their respective sections.  The contribution is in the form 
of annexes and appendices to orders issued by higher headquarters.  Input depends on the 
goal that MDMP is trying to accomplish.  Information Warfare (IW) is the proponent of 
CNO.  CNO is one of the core elements of IW.  The mission is what dictates who will 
participate and their role in the process.  If the mission is CNO, then all the other 
subsystems will support the proponent as necessary to ensure the success of the 
operation.  If the mission is a more conventional mission then CNO is one of the 
subsystems that will support the overall operations.  A hybrid of this is if the during a 
particular phase of the operation, CNO is the lead element, then the priorities change 
during that part of the execution.  An assumption is that CNO will be used in support of 
an operation, the process is very similar, the difference being the priority of effort given 
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by supporting elements to the cause.  In an unlimited time and space continuum, 
everyone receives all needed information and support.  The reality is that main priorities 
are set and resources, such as time and personnel, are exhausted before everyone is 
satisfied.  MDMP is a seven step process (Table 4) that begins with receipt of a mission 
in the form of an order to conduct an operation and ends with the Orders Production.   
 
Military Decision Making Process 
Step 1 Receive the Mission 
Step 2 Mission Analysis 
Step 3 Course of Action Development 
Step 4 Course of Action Analysis 
Step 5 Course of Action Comparison 
Step 6 Course of Action Approval 
Step 7 Orders Production 
 
Table 4. Military Decision Making Process 
 
A commander then analyzes the order to determine how best to accomplish the 
original order’s intent given the current situation.  The staff will prepare multiple viable 
courses of actions to present to the commander.  The commander decides on the best 
course of action and issues the order to execute or implement his decision.  Computer 
network operations can be evaluated in using this format provided there is an established 
criterion to analyze.  The lack of established criterion would make this process 
incomplete and, at best, a guessing game.  Prior to step one, of MDMP, the staff must 
have estimates prepared as to their capabilities in relation to many contingency 
operations.  In the CNO arena, the staff must know what is required to conduct a 
computer network attack or exploitation.  The types of CNOs desired have a 
predetermined package or load out that includes the equipment (hardware), tools 
(software) and knowledge (personnel skills) to implement a planned operation 
successfully.  The staff estimates would also include or list known vulnerabilities to 
different computer operating systems and the vectors that allow the operators take 
advantage of the weakness.  These plans are generic and are a starting point to the 
planning process.  Before conflict, CNO operators are planning operations and modifying 
or validating their staff estimates.  These staff estimates include the intelligence 
preparation of the battlefield.  The intelligence preparation of the battlefield attempts to 
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gain knowledge of the adversary and the targeted system.  This includes how the 
adversary utilizes the targeted system.  The primary goal of IO is “exploitation, 
corruption, disruption, degradation or destruction of [an] adversary information systems 
or their will to fight”.52  How CNO can cause or affect the enemies’ ability to function is 
part of the staff estimate.  The staff estimates are at best a ‘game plan’ without a 
specifically identified opposition.  The opposition may be known, but the most current 
situation and desires (commander’s intent) are not yet applied.  When MDMP is initiated 
with an order from the higher headquarters, Warning Order or Operations Order, the 
planners apply the most relevant or applicable staff estimate(s) and begin the planning 
process. 
 
Step 1 Receipt the Mission 
 
The first step of MDMP is Receipt of the Mission.  The Mission could be from 
the higher headquarters, such as the National Command Authority (NCA) or could be a 
progression from ongoing operations.  The commander, after an initial assessment, 
provides guidance to his staff.  This initial guidance is based on the commander’s 
experience and his understanding of his staff’s capabilities.  The experience of the 
commander and his staff are based on knowledge or skills that have resulted from 
previous operations.  Additionally, the group’s synergy may dictate how much guidance 
the commander provides.  The IO/CNO planning cell begins by reviewing the plan, 
identifying the mission and defining how CNO can assist in the overall operation.  It is 
necessary to recognize whether the operation is primarily a CNO or a support element.  
This recognition has been the root of many conflicts among staffs and planning cells, and 
dictates who has priority.  Every element or planning cell is important and all are 
dependant upon one another.  The cell that is most important at particular junctions in the 
scheme of maneuver must be recognized so that resources, which are often limited, can 
be prioritized accordingly.  For instance, an emergency medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) 
helicopter is crucial to any armed conflict or humanitarian mission.  The resources 
                                                 
52 Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Joint Publication 3-13, 9 October 1998, p. I-9, 
[http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf] September 2003. 
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expended on the survivability of troops may take higher priority over MEDEVAC in a 
combat environment.  Given those same, competing resources in the context of a 
humanitarian mission such as Hurricane Andrew that struck Florida in August 1992, the 
MEDEVAC helicopter might take priority.  It could be argued that survivability of the 
soldiers is always important, but depending on the current situation, threat, and mission, 
the priorities change.  Upon receipt of the mission, the staff brings out its operational 
plans (define, plan with a general focus, but not specify date, times, or locations) and 
standard operating procedures to ensure the every element has a starting point to 
reference in MDMP, in preparation for step two.  A key element is that the commander 
now dictates the allotted time for MDMP. 
 
The responsibility of the IW/IO planning cell during step one is to have CNO staff 
estimates ready so that they may begin the process.  The staff estimates are based on 
known intelligence about the enemy, their infrastructure, the order of battle, and how they 
use their information systems in support of the Enemy Course of Action (ECOA).  The 
planning cell immediately evaluates the delta between the predetermined intelligence 
estimates and what is required by the task at hand.  Actions must be planned to obtain the 
information from a higher headquarters, such as a Request for Information (RFI).  An 
RFI is a formalized solicitation for necessary information through the higher headquarters 
or specific agency.  The planners and organizational units must be prepared to conduct its 
own reconnoitering to gain the necessary intelligence of the battle space or Area of 
Operation (AO).  Understanding of the AO is necessary to allow the staff to transition to 
the next step in MDMP. 
 
Step 2 Mission Analysis 
 
Analysis of the mission is where the initial intelligence is assessed.  The second 
step of MDMP identifies the specific intelligence requirements to conduct an operation.  
The analysis determines what information and assets an organization possesses or has 
access to and identifies what is required to accomplish the mission.  This information 
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leads to the development of a reconnaissance plan to gather the necessary information.  
The delta between information and assets available, and what is required is immediately 
identified.  The delta of information is both requested and received or serves as a 
constraint to the planning process.  Constraints are identified during this step and are 
imposed on the operations by Rules of Engagement, capabilities, organizational structure, 
area of operation (AO), and scheme of maneuver.  In the most basic analysis of a CNO 
mission, the staff would determine if the mission is an attack or exploitation of a 
computer network.  Important facts and assumptions are also identified and validated 
during this phase.  The key element produced from this phase is the commander’s intent.  
The commander’s intent is a statement that defines success and the end state of the 
operation.  The ‘intent’ is the guidance that must be incorporated in all the plans and 
courses of action that the staff produces.  When the staff lacks specific instruction, the 
guidance serves as an azimuth or as the marker on the horizon for the staff to use as 
reference. 
 
The entire staff dissects the directive and as group determines what is being 
ordered of the organization during step two.  If there is any doubt or confusion, the 
commander requests clarification or resolution53.  Specified and implied tasks are 
identified.  The specified tasks are explicit, i.e., destroy the power grid at specified 
location no later than a specified date and time.  Implied tasks are activities upon which 
the success of the specified task depends, e.g., conduct a reconnoiter mission of a 
specified power grid to determine targeting characteristics.  During this step, the goal is 
to ‘paint a picture of the battlefield, to provide the commander and the entire staff an 
understanding area of interest (AI) and the AO they are about to embark.  The AI is the 
area with influence over the objective or organization plans which fall outside the 
boundaries established by the AO.  For example, a homeowner’s property is his AO, 
neighboring homes, roads, noise, parks, etc., that lie outside the homeowner’s property 
line and impact his enjoyment, value, or use is his AI.  In a combat operation, a unit’s AO 
are the boundaries where it can normally dictate its own scheme or maneuver.  The AI 
                                                 
53 FM 34-8-2, Intelligence Officer's Handbook, May 1998, p. 3-2. 
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surrounding the AO may be of value in determining how the commander will maneuver 
his assets.  During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Central Command’s AO was Iraq.  The 
sovereign country of Turkey and other countries that bordered Iraq were part of the AI, 
because they influenced the plans to conduct ground assaults into Iraq.  Available assets 
are also determined during the analysis step.  The staff determines what assets will fall 
under the organization’s control the time period, and other resources necessary to 
accomplish the mission.  The available resources may serve as a constraint to mission 
planning.  Constraints to the operation are identified and listed for the entire staff.  
Constraints are organizational restrictions that prohibit certain actions, limit abilities or 
dictate an action.  Time is a common constraint; it can limit the amount of planning; it 
can set boundaries during phased operations; and it can dictate an action by specifying 
when a target must be neutralized.  Facts and assumptions critical to the mission planning 
are identified.  Plans are made based on the facts and assumption of the higher 
headquarters, friendly and enemy situations, current battlefield conditions and 
intelligence.  The facts and assumptions that impact the planning process or can influence 
the outcome of the operation are critical.  This holistic approach to the analysis of the 
mission provides an understanding that assists all the planning cells in their preparation 
for step three of MDMP. 
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The role of the IW/IO planning cell is to identify the role of CNO within the 
operation.  As specified and implied tasks are identified, the planning cell identifies what 
can be targeted using CNO to assist in the overall operation.  The planning cell identifies 
each CNO target, why it is a CNO target, and the objective, based on the commander’s 
intent.  Network topologies for both the AI and AO are identified.  If the network 
topology is accessible via WAN or LAN, AI and AO are relevant.  The topologies 
provide possible entry points and vectors for CNA and CNE.  The topologies include the 
links and nodes of the topology.  If the specified or implied task is to reconnoiter, CNA 
can play a vital role.  If the reconnoiter mission is to determine the level of enemy 
activity in preparation for battle, then a CNO task could be to identify the existence of 
traffic over a network, the amount of traffic, parties communicating, and message 
content.  If the mission is to disable the power grid, then the role of non-kinetic energy 
weapons can be called upon to target the SCADA system.  The facts and assumptions 
identified by the CNO planning cell are the accessibility and vulnerability of the 
adversary’s networks.  If the adversary does not use computers, then CNA and CNE have 
little use in the operation.  The constraints associated with the operation are also 
applicable to the CNO.  If a unit is precluded from targeting a hospital, then a CNO 
operation with potential for negative, collateral effect on the hospital is an implied 
constraint.  The constraints are identified and used in the process that the CNO planning 
cell can incorporate in a program.  The capabilities of the use of CNO given the analysis 
are incorporated into step three of MDMP.  The CNO cells divide, as do the rest of the 
planners, into separate groups to begin the Course of Action Development. 
 
Step 3 Course of Action Development 
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The third step in MDMP is the development of Course of Action (COA).  The 
goal of this step is to generate realistic options for the commander.  The planners are 
separated into groups, each of which develops an independent COA.  The CNO cell is 
divided and tasked to assist each group of planners in the development of plans.  The 
COA must be viable; throw-away, trivial or impossible plans are not acceptable.  The 
plans must be designed to succeed.  Each COA is a distinct operation and is planned 
independently from the others.  The number of troops and equipment is the same; how 
they are organized and arrayed may vary.  The COA’s suitability, feasibility, 
acceptability, distinguishability, and completeness must be identified.  Suitability is the 
appropriateness of the unit’s organizational structure to accomplish the mission.  
Feasibility is the practicability of the organization’s ability to accomplish the mission.  
Acceptability is the tolerability or risk that the commander can tolerate for its action.  
Acceptability is not only defined by the commander; it is imposed by outside 
organizations, doctrines, Rules of Engagement, etc.  Distinguishability is the clear 
difference between the other COAs, and is imposed by the commander.  The commander 
may dictate part of the plan to differentiate between COA.  In simple terms, he may 
dictate that COA I will be executed in daylight hours, while COA II is to be executed 
during cover of darkness.  Otherwise, the plans may be similar.  However, risk and 
enemy’s reactions may vary drastically.  Each COA must be complete; and must be 
operationally comprehensive, from the designated starting point to the end state as 
defined in the commander’s intent statement.  The COAs clearly describe how the 
organization will fulfill the commander’s intent.  The number of COAs developed 
depends upon the size of the staff, time available to plan, and the size of the organization.  
 
The role of the CNO planning cell is a significant part of the course of action 
development process.  The CNO planning cell identifies the CNO target and assesses the 
capabilities of the organization, and the characteristics of the target.  The cell develops 
the detailed plan on how it is going to accomplish its task and how the plan supports 
overall mission of the organization.  Whether the task is CNE (alter or change or add and 
remove data) or CNA (deny, destroy, and degrade), the CNO planning cell is responsible 
for providing CNO capabilities to commanders and their staff. 
 
A common technique is to follow a series of steps, identified in the book, Hacking 
Exposed, as Anatomy of an Attack (Figure 5).  Anatomy of an Attack describes an attack 
methodology that involves identification of a network known as footprinting, a network 
executing the attack or exploitation, cleaning up, and creating and planting backdoors.  
Common steps for reconnoitering of a network or computer system are footprinting, 
scanning, and enumeration.  The level of intrusiveness increases from the former to the 
latter.  Footprinting is a systematic approach that enables the (operative) to create a 
complete profile of an organization’s security posture54.  It is electronic passive 
reconnaissance.  The goal of footprinting is to discover information related to the 
organization’s operational workspace without making direct contact with the target 
organization.  Scanning is the active probing of a network to determine if the target 
organization is accessible through cyberspace.  An example of scanning might be an 
active attempt to make contact with the target organization via the Internet or through 
email to determine if it is accessible by using certain network protocols.  Enumerating 
                                                 
54 McClure, S., Scambray, J. Kurtz, G. (2001). Hacking Exposed, 3rd Edition.  Osborne/McGraw-Hill:  
New York, p. 4. 
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is the ability to glean information from the target organization by active probing from the 
discovery of the two previous steps, or if they failed to produce results.  The key 
differences between the previous techniques lie in the levels of intrusiveness55.  For 
example, to enumerate, an operative must be connected to the target organization.  In a 
geographical sense, a border crossing to gather information is more intrusive compared to 
reconnaissance from the forward line of friendly troops (FLOT).  Once the system is 
known and vulnerabilities are identified, the operators will attempt to access the system.  
Gaining Access occurs when enough data from the three previous steps has been obtained 
to make an informed attempt (at infiltration)56.  Where enumeration is the act of 
obtaining passwords or keys, gaining access is their use to access the systems.  With 
access to a system, escalation of privileges is attempted by either exploiting poorly 
configured systems or exploiting vulnerabilities.  A poorly constructed system is a 
network that operates correctly, but is mis-configured from a security perspective.  The 
exploitation of a vulnerability is the utilization of a system or program that was 
fundamentally flawed in its development.  The former is a weakness in implementation 
while the latter exists in the development of software and devices.  Both can be exploited 
to gain greater access and escalate privileges.  The next step after entry is to escalate 
privileges.  Computer systems are laden with permissions.  Access is gained at one level 
of permission.  Increasing the access privileges or permissions of an exploited user 
without authorization is known as “escalating privileges.”  Pilfering is further 
reconnaissance from inside the target organization’s system.  Pilfering evaluates trust 
among systems and identifies mechanisms to gain access to the other trusted systems57.  
With access and escalated privileges, the operator can commence the CNA or CNE.  The 
next step, depending on the mission, is to cover up the intrusion.  Covering Tracks is the 
elimination or hiding of evidence of the intrusion or attempted intrusion, from 
enumeration to pilfering.  Modifying system logs or masking activity to appear normal 
and routine accomplishes this.  A back door is an unauthorized entry point into a network 
system.  Creating a Back Door is the act of leaving an avenue of approach that allows 
                                                 
55 Ibid., p. 64. 
56 Ibid., Backcover. 
57 Ibid. 
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unauthorized access into the system by circumventing defenses and maintaining 
privileged access.  These steps are not exclusive; a skilled operator may use a more 




Figure 5.   Attack Methodology 
 
Targeting considerations are both quantitative and qualitative.  During the COA 
development, the staff will produce measures or criteria upon which to base the viability 
of the plan or how close it compares to the commander’s intent.  The criteria will vary by 
individual operation.  The criteria used for CNA consist of a combination of factors and 
characteristics identified in the CARVER and Schmitt analysis.  The CARVER and 
Schmitt analysis has tools that help decision makers analyze and measure CNO targets.  
The former is more general in target analysis, while the latter provides a legalistic 
perspective to CNO.  CARVER is comprised of several subcategories, each part defining 
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an aspect of the target and the necessary elements to determine the target’s viability.  The 
Schmitt analysis is a methodology for measured response to computer network operations 
developed Michael N. Schmitt, professor of International Law, at the George C. Marshall 
European Center for Security studies. 
 
MDMP is fed by information; part of that information is target analysis.  
CARVER is a methodology used for target analysis and vulnerability assessment by 
special operations forces (SOF).  CARVER is an acronym for Criticality, Accessibility, 
Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect and Recognizability.  Each element defines an 
aspect of a target and the necessary facts to determine its feasibility to engage.  CARVER 
attempts to simplify target descriptions into manageable elements.  Each element has a 
distinct objective to prevent overlap of criteria and provides the decision maker clear and 
concise information.  This information is used by mission planners to decide whether a 
target will be engaged, and to shed insight as to how best to engage the target.  The 
CARVER methodology’s measurable factors are described as follows: 
• Criticality.  Criticality, or target value, is the primary consideration in 
targeting.  A target is critical when its destruction or damage would 
significantly impair an enemy's political, economic, or military operations.  
It may also be critical to observe a target in a special reconnaissance (SR) 
mission (e.g., a key road junction for signs of major enemy movement).  
Individual targets within a target system must be considered in relation to 
other elements of that system.  The value of a target may change as the 
situation develops, requiring the use of time-sensitive targeting methods. 
• Accessibility.  In order to damage, destroy, or conduct surveillance of a 
target, SOF must be able to reach it, either physically or via indirect (i.e., 
standoff weapons or surveillance) means.  During SR missions, SOF must 
not only be able to reach the target, but must often remain there for an 
extended time period.  Finally, SOF must be able to exfiltrate out of the 
target area. 
• Recuperability.  In the case of direct action (DA) missions, it is important 
to estimate how long it will take the enemy to repair, replace, or bypass 
the damage inflicted on the target.  Recuperability is a vital supporting 
element of criticality.  A target may not be lucrative for SOF employment 
if it can be repaired, replaced, or bypassed in a short time with minimum 
resources. 
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• Vulnerability.  A target is vulnerable if SOF has the means and expertise 
to conduct the planned mission and to achieve the desired level of damage 
or other objectives as assigned. 
• Effect.  For targets of a more purely military value (e.g., munitions depots; 
headquarters complexes; Petroleum Oil and Lubricants (POL) facilities; 
Lines of Communication (LOCs); and Command, Control, and 
Communications (C3) complexes), the impact of both attacking (or 
surveilling) the target and achieving the desired results must be assessed.  
For targets that are critical in both the military and civilian regimes, the 
political, economic, legal, and psychological effects of the mission must 
be evaluated as well as the impact of target destruction on the health and 
welfare of the indigenous civilian population. 
• Recognizability.  The target must be identifiable under various weather, 
light, and seasonal conditions and configurations (if applicable) without 
being confused with other targets or target components.  Sufficient data 
must be available for SOF to differentiate the target from similar objects in 
the target area.  The same requirement exists to distinguish the target's 
critical damage points and stress points from their parent structures and 
surroundings.58  
The six aforementioned factors provide both decision maker and operators an idea 
of the complexity of the mission and the ability to engage the target effectively. 
 
The Schmitt methodology identifies six categories for use in analyzing CNO59.  
Additionally, this methodology adds a quantitative weight to each category.  These 
categories correspond directly to attributes associated with computer networks and the 
resulting consequences if and when targeted.  The six factors that the Schmitt Analysis 
describes are severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability, and 
presumptive legitimacy.  Additionally, the categories are weighted to reflect the degree of 
consequence for each factor.  Schmitt defines the six criteria from a legalistic approach.  
 
The severity factor measures the physical damage or harm inflicted as a result of 
targeting a system.  The destruction or harm is equivalent to the battle damage that results 
                                                 
58 Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures, 10 August 1993, p. II-9, 
[http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/jt/3-05.5/jp3_05_5.pdf] September 2003. 
59 Schmitt Computer network Attack and The Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a 
Normative Framework, June 1999, p. 18. 
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from kinetic energy.  Bomb damage assessment (BDA) identifies the effect of kinetic 
munitions.  Schmitt uses severity to describe “armed attacks (that) threaten(s) physical 
injury or destruction of property”60.  It is an attack on the “physical well-being (usually 
occupied by) the apex of the human hierarchy of need”61.  Severity identifies the kinetic 
resultant of the attack. 
 
Immediacy is the factor that applies time and spacing in relation to the effect of 
the attack.  The timing is relevant to the operation.  During an air attack, a CNA directed 
at the suppression of air defenses, seconds are critical compared to an economic embargo 
where the target is to deny the opposition use of an information-specific system.  
The negative consequences of armed coercion, or threat thereof, usually 
occur with great immediacy, while those of other forms of coercion 
develop more slowly.  Thus, the opportunity for the target state or the 
international community to seek peaceful accommodation is hampered in 
the former case62.  
By the nature of each operation, timing is relative to mission objectives and 
period allocated for the implementation.   
 
The directness factor is the desired impact of the operation that can be specifically 
traced to resultant effects of a CNO.  The number of combat systems added to an 
operation increases the number of variables and dilutes the directness of any one system.  
Directness precisely links an action to a reaction. 
The consequences of armed coercion are more directly tied to the actus 
reus than in other forms of coercion, which often depend on numerous 
contributory factors to operate.  Thus, the prohibition on force precludes 
negative consequences with greater certainty63. 
 






The ability to identify consequences and directness allows commanders to gauge 
the operational response with a known outcome.  The directness of the effect can 
determine whether the CNO is the main operation or is in support of an operation, 
depending on the acceptable levels of hostilities.   
 
The level of infringement upon the rights or property of the target is addressed by 
the invasiveness factor.   
In armed coercion, the act causing the harm usually crosses into the target 
state, whereas in economic warfare the acts generally occur beyond the 
target’s borders.  As a result, even though armed and economic acts may 
have roughly similar consequences, the former represents a greater 
intrusion on the rights of the target state and, therefore, is more likely to 
disrupt international stability64. 
In a fist fight, levels of invasiveness can be compared to a punch in the mouth and 
an errant swing that misses the target.  Both acts are invasive to one on the receiving end 
of the fist.  Their levels of invasiveness however, are quite different in terms of 
effectiveness.  In terms of certain penal codes, the wild swing is assault while the 
connecting punch is also classified as battery.  In a nautical comparison of invasiveness, a 
warning shot across a ship’s bow is less grave then a direct hit. 
 
The factor of measurability addresses the consequences attributed to the CNO.  
An action that results in equivalent kinetic energy damage can be measured.  Collateral 
damage is measured as is the probability of its occurrence.  The collateral damage must 
be considered because inflicting such consequential damage may exceed the acceptable 
risk or scope of the operation. 
While the consequences of armed coercion are usually easy to ascertain 
(e.g., a certain level of destruction), the actual negative consequences of 
other forms of coercion are harder to measure.  This fact renders the 
appropriateness of community condemnation, and the degree of 
vehemence contained therein, less suspect in the case of armed force65. 




An action resulting in a system’s latency over a long period of time will be less 
obvious.  The measurability factor attempts to determine all consequences of the actions 
taken. 
 
Presumptive legitimacy deals with the laws, customs, treaties, binding 
agreements, and Rules of Engagement associated with the operation.  It is the legality and 
authority of the operation, measured by various standards and recognized authority to 
conduct the operation. 
In most cases, whether under domestic or international law, the application 
of violence is deemed illegitimate absent some specific exception such as 
self-defense.  The cognitive approach is prohibitory.  By contrast, most 
other forms of coercion—again in the domestic and international sphere--
are presumptively lawful, absent a prohibition to the contrary.  The 
cognitive approach is permissive.  Thus, the consequences of armed 
coercion are presumptively impermissible, whereas those of other coercive 
acts are not (as a very generalized rule).66 
The conventional forces of DoD do not have the flexibility to decide at the 
operational level on the presumption of law.  This presumption is likely to be identified in 
advance.  The goal of the operator is to determine the scope of the presumptive 
legitimacy.   
 
The factors identified have an associated, logarithmic scale that applies a weight 
or value to each.  This weight provides a quantitative measure to the analysis.  The scale 
can vary so long as it is consistent in terms of what it is measuring and is applied 
consistently to achieve and assess the correct metrics.  
 
Step 4 Course of Action Analysis 
 
Analysis of the COA, step four, is also described as war gaming.  It tests each 
COA against the criteria discussed in step three of COA development, and includes other 
                                                 
66 Ibid. 
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conditions cited by the commander.  This step does not compare one COA to another.  
The analysis must be unbiased, and must not be designed to favor one COA over another.  
War gaming the plan identifies advantages and disadvantages of each individual COA.  
War gaming tests the flow of the operation and how the organization will act, react and 
how it will counteract actions and events identified by the COA and threat expectations  
Each plan must be evaluated against many possible outcomes, based on the situation and 
known variables, such as enemy disposition.  At a minimum, the worst-case scenario and 
the most likely or probable action by the enemy should be used to test each COA.  Time 
will dictate how many scenarios are likely to be tested.  The final step of war gaming is to 
modify the COA to ensure both that it can be implemented and that it satisfies the 
commander’s intent. 
 
It is the CNO cell’s responsibility to provide the operation with means and 
methods to target the enemy’s Centers of Gravity (CoG).  The CoG are those 
characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its 
freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight67.  The CoG uses information to 
operate effectively.  It is the responsibility of the cell to identify the links and nodes of 
the network that is passing and storing the information.  When the network topology is 
identified, then vulnerabilities are analyzed.  Once the targets are identified, they are 
measured against the established criteria.  The CNO cell cannot plan this action in a 
vacuum.  The intelligence cell (J2/N2/G2) provides the enemy’s actions and reactions68 
during the war gaming process.  The J2 provides an intelligence estimate of what to 
expect from the enemy based on doctrine, tactics, lessons learned and any other of the 
myriad intelligence inputs.  The CNO plan provides details of how it can influence or use 
a Named Area of Interest (NAI) to assist in intelligence gathering.  An NAI is the 
geographical area or object with information that will satisfy specific requirements.  The 
information collected within the NAI will help to confirm or deny a particular enemy 
course of action.  
                                                 
67 [http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-06/gloss.pdf] March 2004. 
68 FM 34-8-2, Intelligence Officer's Handbook, May 1998, p. 3-4. 
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A situational template portrays how a CNO will influence the battle space given 
this COA.  The template mirrors the phases of the overall operation, and identifies the 
targets and plan of engagement for each.  The targeted systems must be important to the 
operation and must synchronize with the overall scheme of maneuver.  The CNO plan 
must be honest about capabilities and expectations, and is based on facts and assumptions 
that support the operation’s outcome.  The facts and assumptions are validated by the J2 
and the entire planning staff.  Once a comprehensive plan is completed, it is submitted for 
comparison to the other COA. 
 
Step 5 Course of Action Comparison 
 
The comparison of COA to one another occurs during step five, the goal being to 
identify the best COA.  The planning staff reconsolidates and objectively evaluates each 
COA.  Each planning staff presents their COA, the objective is to identify the best COA, 
not sell the plan.  The commander and staff members must be aware that ownership to a 
plan may develop.  Ownership reflects the desire for one’s plan to outperform other 
COA.  This desire can impact the objective presentation and analysis of the COA.  COA 
are objectively assessed using quantified and qualified measures rather than presentation 
skills.  The criteria are weighted to add value based on the commander’s guidance.  The 
commander will use the weighted variables based on their decisiveness in the overall 
operation.  All COAs will be judged on the same criteria.  The best COA is defined by 
the highest probability of success based on the criteria established by the commander.  
The COA can be tracked in the phases of the operation.  The phased approach allows for 
adjustment of the evaluation criteria’s importance as focus of the battle changes.  For 
instance, a criterion may be to maintain the element of surprise during the operation.  
During phase one of the operation, the element of surprise may be weighted to reflect its 
importance, where that same criterion may not be as relevant during subsequent 
operational phases.  The comparison of COAs and the evaluation criteria allow the 
commander to compare different concepts of the same operation with one standard 
grading mechanism. 
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 During step five, the CNO cell consolidates and provides an objective evaluation 
of the CNO portion of all COA.  The CNO cell validates the intelligence necessary to 
execute all proposed plans successfully.  Each plan is then given a score, based on the 
criteria.  The commander expects and depends on the CNO’s cell technical competency 
to validate this portion of the operation.  Once all of the COAs are compared, the 
commander decides on the most effective COA.  This assessment is based on quantitative 
and qualitative measure. 
 
Step 6 Course of Action Approval 
 
The commander’s decision is the sixth step of MDMP.  This step is the approval 
or modification of a single COA, a modification of all COAs, or a more narrow focus of 
one COA that contains attributes of other COAs.  The commander’s decision may require 
that the war gaming process, (step 4 of MDMP), recommence based on new guidance 
provided by the commander.  If the commander does reject a COA, modifications may be 
required.  In event of such rejection, the commander must provide guidance and the staff 
must return to step 2, Mission Analysis.  When the commander approves a single COA at 
the end of this process then the planning phase is complete.   
 
Step 7 Orders Production 
 
The final step of the MPMP is production of the order.  The order, or Operations 
Order (OPORD), is distributed to subordinate commanders so that they may plan and 
execute the stated objectives of the higher headquarters.  The OPORD contains the 
scheme of maneuvers dictating how the commander expects to fight the battle.  The 
scheme of maneuver - the part of the order that directs the sequence of battle - directly 
reflects the COA that the commander decided to implement during the previous six steps 
of the MDMP. 
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2. New CNO Methodology Resultant Equities 
The Computer Network Operations methodology proposes that you can inject 
extrapolated data from the CARVER targeting methodology and the Schmitt analysis into 
the military decision-making process.  The data to be incorporated must be clearly 
defined in order that it can be used uniformly across different commands and by different 
decision makers.  The factors identified in CARVER and Schmitt can be combined to 
determine a single and more complete listing of factors that will be utilized in evaluating 
the proposed applications of CNO.  The combined factors can either be used exhaustively 
in the decision process or they can be utilized in a modified form that accelerates the 
decision making process.  The factors are defined in an operational sense to describe their 
applicability to operators.  The explanations of the factors are presented to allow one 
common definition and criterion for evaluation and comparison.  By having clear and 
concise definitions, commanders can have common principles to evaluate across multiple 
platforms. 
Criticality- Criticality defines the importance of the target in relation to the 
overall mission.  Criticality is defined as “a system or asset that, if attacked, would result 
in catastrophic loss of life and/or catastrophic economic loss”69.  From a military 
perspective, the criticality of a system is determined by its importance to the success of 
the operation.  Criticality is clouded by targets that serve dual use, in both the civilian and 
the military infrastructure.   
Accessibility- The ability to reach the targeted system, accessibility can be 
measured in various ways.  Ease of access to exfiltrate must also be considered.  
Questions that need to be addressed are Is the target reachable from outside the network 
via the WAN or must the target be accessed from within the LAN?  Can the operator and 
the data be removed or exfiltrated?  
 
 
                                                 




Three categories that can be addressed are delivery vectors, payload insertion and 
the entry points to the network.  For instance, can the payload can be injected from the 
WAN using a vector?  Must the payload be inserted from within the LAN without an 
allied operator (e.g., as an e-mail attachment)?  Must the insertion be performed from 
within the LAN by an operator (requires no monitoring, requires the operator to execute 
code and/or harvest information)? 
 
Recuperability- Recuperability is the ability for the target system to regenerate 
the processes or to work around the problem.  This is time-critical in relation to the 
operation.  The assumption is that, given unlimited time, all targets are recoverable or the 
effect can be mitigated.  The ability for the enemy to bypass or breach an obstacle is 
relative to the sequenced timing of the mission’s execution. 
 
Vulnerability- Do the operators have the means and knowledge to execute the 
mission?  How complex is the mission, including infiltration and exfiltration of operators, 
and the level of technical expertise and knowledge of the targeted system?  Means, 
knowledge and technical expertise vary drastically, depending on which team conducts 
the mission.  Expertise in one technical field does not necessarily carryover to other 
technical fields.  This must be assessed based on the team’s technical and tactical 
abilities. 
 
Effect- While it is the desired consequence of the action, effect considers the 
action’s worst possible collateral consequence and the probability of its coming to bear.  
Probability of the most likely outcome of the action is taken into account.  A weapon’s 
effectiveness is key to determining its direct effect. 
 
Indirect effect requires more planning and thought, and may vary depending on 
the geopolitical culture of the target and the intended audience.  The difficulties in 
measuring the indirect effect are exemplified by comparing the reaction of two computer 
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terminal operators when the system is latent.  One operator may be flustered, impacting 
his ability to focus and perform, while the other turns his attention to non-network duties 
without frustration.  Predicting the outcome requires, not only the knowledge of the 
system, but understanding the enemy that is working on the target systems.  The effect 
can be as much physical as psychological, and must be explored to ensure that the 
difference between the desired effect and the actual result are within the acceptable risk 
of the decision maker. 
 
Recognizability- It is essential to be able to identify the targeted system within a 
maze of cyberspace.  One cannot target what he cannot identify.  Recognizability 
includes an understanding of the topology interconnecting the targeted system as well as 
the scheme’s redundancies.  Depending on the operation, the need to pinpoint the system 
may not be as necessary.  This is true if the system can be neutralized by targeting a 
single point of failure in the network topology, where attack on that point would 
accomplish the mission.  The bigger the footprint of the attack, the more likely one will 
reach the intended target. 
 
Severity- In terms of brutality and audaciousness, severity is different from 
effect.  While severity measures the amount of physical destruction or harm that can 
result from the attack, Effect measures the likelihood of achieving the end result. 
 
Severity is situation-relative.  In attempting to create traffic congestion, consider 
the following possibilities.  Disabling a traffic signal in a rural community does not 
compare to disabling the tollbooth traffic signals on San Francisco’s Golden Gate Bridge 
at the beginning of rush hour traffic.  Couple that with a system that is used to save lives.  
By targeting the emergency management system (911) that controls police, fire, and other 
emergency first responders, the severity of an emergency can be aggravated to increase 
the number of casualties. 
 
56 
Immediacy- The interval between successful execution of the operation, viewing 
battle damage, and achieving the desired effects is known as immediacy.  When the 
commander wants to see the desired effect is the key point to immediacy.  Does an 
operation’s success, require instantaneous results or will a gradual reaction, over an 
extended period of time, suffice?  When considering immediacy, the reaction of the target 
and its ability to counter the action must also be well thought-out: for instance, an 
instantaneous action that can be quickly countered, thus negating the action.  A target’s 
ability to counter CNO successfully can be attributed to the time available.  Immediacy 
can also be determined by time and space.  Is the target fleeting, thus offering a limited or 
short engagement availability?  Is the target one of opportunity, that can be easily 
engaged once positively identified? 
 
Directness- Directness is the ability to determine the cause of the severity and its 
effect, and to associate that with the CNO operation.  Consider engaging a target with one 
weapon system, such as a sniper, and effectively immobilizing a military leader vs. a 
combined arms attack that includes ground, air and naval forces that targets that same 
military leader.  Who caused the immobilization can be difficult to ascertain.  In CNO, 
directness may be necessary to measure the usefulness of the tool. 
 
Invasiveness- The level of intrusion defines the level of invasiveness.  To 
conduct surveillance from the friendly or neutral side of a border, or by using highly 
technical equipment that can be commanded from afar, is less invasive then inserting 
someone into a sovereign entity to load a tool or exploit that will enable the surveillance.  
The current state of hostilities between the combatants influences the level of 
invasiveness permitted.     
 
Measurability- The ability to quantify the effect in degrees of physical 
destruction, economic damage, magnitude or causing someone to act or not act based on 
the CNO is the measurability factor.  Measurement can be done in quantity, (i.e. the 
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number of troops killed or number of buildings destroyed) or in terms of absolute 
comparison (i.e., more than, less than, or equal to).  A binary measurement tool can also 
be used to determine an action or inaction: true or false, yes or no, on or off.  The 
quantifier should be applied in a manner that provides meaning to the decision maker. 
 
Presumptive Legitimacy- The assumption that the action is just and defendable 
by not only laws or customs, but by less precise measures such as ethics and codes of 
conduct.  At a military operational level, the laws of war apply as well as individual 
ethics.  Proportionality is one of the aspects of Presumptive Legitimacy; different from 
Effect and Severity, it deals with a response to an action.  Presumptive Legitimacy is tied 
to geopolitical factors and how they are applied to hostilities or level of hostilities in 
general.  
 
An appropriate metric is needed to allow commanders to visualize the results of 
their decisions. A template can assist in evaluating the acceptable level of risk or 
exposure (Figure 6).  The proposed CNO Resultant Equities Model (REM) provides 
control that a commander can use to align his warfare knowledge with the capabilities of 
CNO as a weapons system.  The REM organizes factors into evaluation criteria.  The 
evaluation criteria are presented in the form of a question to the COA developers.  This 
question is derived by integrating the CNO factors and the commander’s intent, 
applicable ROE and other applicable limitations and constraints.  The question or query is 
the Issue in Question (IQ) in the CNO RE Model.  With the IQ identified, a Unit of 
Measure (UM) is developed.  The UM can be quantitative, qualitative, binary or 
benchmarked, as long as it can be logically justified and is appropriate to what the 
commander is attempting to compare.  The UM is given a rating on a scale.  The scale is 
consistent throughout the REM, it can be 1 to 10, with 10 being optimal or 10 to 1, 1 
being optimal, as long as the desired result is consistent  
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The desired result defines the scale; the staff is either pursuing a high or low score 
depending on IQ and UM.  The REM further brackets possible outcomes from a best-case 
to a worst-case scenario.  The brackets do not have to be uniform in size.  The principle 
measure of bracket size is each bracket’s ability to distinguish cut off points.  In a 
monetary evaluation, an amount of money might be the distinguishing factor, e.g., “> 
$1,000” or “< $1,000”.  In a budgeting application, that same monetary measure may not 
apply; a better cut off might be measured by reimbursable, funded, or unfunded 
requirement.  Both examples address monies, but in context, they have different 
meanings to the decision maker.  The brackets are aligned with UM as depicted in the 
severity example.   
 
 
Figure 6.   Severity 
 
The commander and the planning staff determine the factors to be used for COA 
evaluation.  The REM is used to compare the COA during step 5 of MDMP.  The IQ, 
UM, scale and brackets are tailored to the operation.  The REM is created to determine 
the best COA, not make one COA more attractive or palatable then another.  During the 
COA comparison, when the IQ is addressed, the worst-case outcome is selected by 
assigning a 1 to the box below the appropriate and expected outcomes.  Assigning the 1 
activates a formula that will output a number known as the Resultant Equity (RE).  RE is 
a quantified measure of risk for the given input.  The REM will only recognize the worse 
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or highest value.  The commander can add importance to scale by applying weight to the 
factors (Figure 7).  Most often, weighting factors are multipliers.  Make sure that 
weighting is correct and meets the commander’s objectives.  The weight multiple is 
added to the RE, increasing its numerical value when greater then 1, and reducing its 
value when less then 1.  Additionally, the commander can set a benchmark to identify a 
value that warrants scrutiny if it is exceeded.  This is known as the Resultant Equities 
Threshold (RET).  In the example below, the weighed criteria has a multiple of 2 and a 
RET of 15.  The output is multiplied by the value of the weight.  A value of 15 will result 
in an output of DANGER next to the RE. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Criticality of Target 
 
The formula for this output is [(expected worse case scenario Unit of Measure) 
multiplied by selection] multiplied by weight] = resultant equities.  If resultant equities 
exceeds 15, “Danger” is displayed.  Mathematically, [(8)*1]*2=16; if 16 > 15, then 
Danger.  Weighing these factors must be consistent with other valuation schemes 
currently being used by decision makers to assist in assessment of proposed plans. 
 
The REM is used with other methodologies to assist the commander in decision 
making.  The methodologies allow the commander to compare different aspects of a 
CNO and to quantify the output.  The goal of the CNO is to frame and populate the 
formula accurately in order to obtain a quality output.  CARVER and Schmitt provide a 
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foundation for the criteria and issues in question.  The CNO cell has the responsibility to 
address all factors in context of the operation.  The commander and staff have 
responsibility to understand what is necessary to conduct CNO.  This understanding 
allows the accurate COA analysis and comparison.  MDMP, CARVER, Schmitt and 
REM serve as a decision support system for the commander and staff.  Used correctly, it 
can enhance the success of an operation.  Used incorrectly it can be useless, or in a worst-
case scenario, can cause the organization to pursue a COA that is fundamentally flawed 
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VII. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH  
There is a capabilities gap between the emerging and future threats and 
commanders’ ability to attack and exploit the battle space.  The President has already 
emphasized the need for a strategy to address this gap.  It is now up to DoD to conduct a 
thorough analysis and to identify current capabilities and integration into the armed 
forces.  The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) (Figure 8) is 
an appropriate model to conduct the analysis.  CNO can be developed as a traditional 
weapons system.  Beginning with a review of the doctrine how we fight and win our 
nations wars.  By using JCIDS many of the questions that arise from this emerging 
technology can be addressed with the right Joint focus.  The Functional Area Analysis 
(FAA) will provide the task, conditions and standards for the employment of CNO.  The 
Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) assesses the capabilities gap between current and 
future objectives.  The capabilities gap can be bridged using the Functional Solutions 
Analysis (FSA).  The FSA is a review of the core components of the military, and 
includes: Doctrine, Organizational, Training, Material, Leadership/Education, Personnel, 
and Facilities (DOTMLPF). 
 
During FSA, the evaluation of DOTMLPF and how a change to one or more of 
the components can contribute to bridging the capabilities gap.  Each proposed change is 
identified, analyzed, and alternatives are evaluated and compared to other alternatives.  
The output of the analysis is the recommended change to the existing DOTMPLF.  These 
changes are reviewed by Post Independent Analysis (PIA).  The PIA is an independent 
review board that evaluates not only the recommended changes, but the process that was 
used, facts and assumptions, and any other relevant variables to determine the best 
changes to integrate into DoD.  Inputs to this process are the Initial Capabilities 
Document (ICD), Capabilities Development Document (CDD) and the Capabilities 
Production Document (CPD).  These documents identify the capabilities gap, evaluation 
of DOTMLPF, current technology available, ability to develop new technology, and  
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whether capability exists to produce the weapons system given the current and potential 
technology.  The following example illustrates the process, with evaluation focus on the 














































Figure 8.   JCIDS Analysis70 
 
Here are some of the obvious questions that can be addressed in relation to CNO 
and DOTMLPF: 
• Doctrine - How can CNO be incorporated in doctrine at the Joint and 
Component level? 
• Organizational - How should units organize to utilize CNO effectively? 
• Training - How do we train operators to conduct CNO? 
• Materials – What materials or tools do we have to conduct CNO and how 
do we use them? 
• Leadership and Education – How do we inform commanders regarding 




                                                 
70 Tudor, Rod, LTC, Naval Postgraduate School, January 2004. 
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• Personnel – How do we recruit skilled, technical operators that are in high 
demand due to their transferable skills in the civilian market place?  Can 
this need be outsourced to civilian contractors?  Can conventional 
operators be trained to conduct these missions? 
• Facilities – What facilities are necessary to train and sustain the CNO 
mission.  
There are two types of information operation: offensive and defensive.  
“Offensive operations involve the integrated use of assigned and supporting capabilities 
and activities, mutually supported by intelligence”71.  This research focused on the 
offensive nature of CNO.  Further research is required to develop a defensive capability 
for US cyber infrastructure.  “Defensive operations integrate and coordinate policies and 
procedures, operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend information and 
information systems”72.  US adversaries have much more to gain from CNO than does 
the United States.  Action must be taken to harness this new weapon and harden our 
systems.  The US ability to get into the battle space of their opponent is unprecedented; 
however, this over reliance on technology can be a hindrance as well.   
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Computer Network Operations have the potential of great impact, either as 
offensive or defensive weapons.  This duality of purpose makes CNO difficult to counter.  
A more complex network topology increases risk of penetration and exploitation.  When 
a commander has greater understanding of the network components, he is better suited to 
make informed decisions on precise targeting.   
 
The proposed methodology provides a qualitative and quantitative means to 
address CNO.  The methodology cannot stand alone.  To be effective it must be infused 
with accurate and pertinent intelligence.  This intelligence focus should contain 
traditional elements such as composition of enemy forces, but it should also include 
CARVER and the Schmitt analysis.  By understanding what to look for in CNO 
intelligence, commanders will know what to analyze when contemplating COA and 
potential objectives. 
  
To what extent should the Department of Defense utilize the new technology?  It 
is important know the capabilities and limits of the weapons.  How does the US reign in 
the power when potentially anyone with a rudimentary education, the ability to read, and 
access to the internet can be a viable player in the battle space of CNO?  The US military 
has educated and informed personnel and provides the tools that have a dual use for 
normal functions and CNO in the form of computers, networks and connectivity beyond 
the local area network.  The combination of personnel and the platforms for CNO 
warrants the control of this weapon system.  Military leaders have strict supervision and 
controls of conventional weapons, such as pistols and the ammunition, yet do not 
necessarily view their own networks as potential weapon systems that can be decisive in 
battle.  Those who do, may not have the scope to exercise the potential of CNO 
efficiently or effectively without the necessary command and controls functions in place 
prior to engagements.  In one aspect, a commander may use CNO as a weapon to cause a 
desired effect, it is the undesired 2nd and 3rd order effects that may be less desirable that 
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he may not be able to control or assess like conventional weapons.  The weapons and 
platforms for CNO are readily available, so strict controls must be implemented to ensure 
the decision maker(s), who has the appropriate responsibility and accountability, is in 
command of this power. 
 
The United States is more susceptible to an effective CNO attack and reprisal due 
to its military’s growing dependence on computers and networks.  Susceptibility to 
counterattack is so great that computers’ use must be contemplated while measured 
against DoD’s ability to be prepared for war.  The end state should be for DoD to be at 
the apex of readiness while realizing the geopolitical nature of warfighting and the norms, 
opinions and attitudes of world community.  There are two counterpoints to CNO.  Just 
because it can, does not give the US the mandate to conduct CNO and the counter 
argument is because the US can, it should.  The decision to act or not act should exercise 
command and control, such as the proposed methodology, for commanders to make 
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